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People are highly attentive to others’ motivations when assessing credibility. For 
instance, political candidates who appear to act against self-interests (e.g., praise an 
opponent) are considered more trustworthy than those who act in self-serving ways (e.g., 
attack an opponent or praise themselves). How early in life does self-interest based 
trust/skepticism develop? A main goal of the dissertation was to test whether children’s 
trust behaviors are influenced by self-interest cues. 
In two studies, adult and child participants (N = 136) played a finding game with 
another player. The other player served as the informant for the location of hidden prizes. 
Participants, seated in another room, had to guess (from two potential locations) where 
they thought the prize actually was. Informants were incentivized via reward rules to be 
truthful (informants only benefitted if participants guessed correctly) or deceitful 
(informants only benefitted if participants guessed incorrectly). If participants can infer 
the informants’ credibility solely from reward rules associated with self-interest, they 
should trust the other player less often if interests conflict.   
A second goal was to identify socio-cognitive skills that may be associated with 
people’s ability to (mis)trust selectively. Some of the skills that were investigated 
 vii 
include: participants’ ability to remember and manipulate information, awareness that 
people can infer others’ intentions, understanding that people may arrive at different 
conclusions when reasoning about the same stimuli, and general intuitions about whether 
others are likely to keep their word. 
Like adults, children playing the finding game sometimes adjusted their behavior 
flexibly and strategically to match self-interests—without having prior expectations about 
another individual’s predisposition to cooperate. Specifically, children and adults trusted 
their partner more often when the game incentivized cooperation versus competition. 
However, our results also suggest that children’s ability to benefit from cooperation 
incentives has not fully developed in the elementary school years: even 9-year-olds 
seemed more suspicious of partners with common interests than did adults. Children’s 
working memory skills predicted whether they would perform similarly to adults. Taken 
together, these findings significantly advance our understanding of children’s trust 
judgments as guided by their self-interest based inferences. 
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1. Introduction 
Many contemporary theories of developmental psychology have continued 
Piaget’s conception of children as autonomous theorists or “little scientists” who will 
arrive at their own notions of the world by actively exploring the environments, and 
gathering evidence about their naïve theories (e.g., Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1997). It is often assumed that 
theory formation about domains such as permanence of objects and conservation of 
quantity will mostly depend on the child’s first-hand observations. Moreover, children 
will update these provisional theories as they find evidence in favor and against previous 
conceptions. Another group of researchers argue that human minds are highly constrained 
innately (i.e., so that we can only formulate a rather small set of possible representations 
and rules; e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 1989; Spelke, Breinlinger, 
Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). 
Lately, a complementary line of research has received increasing attention: 
children also appear to construct theories based on direct instruction, and this reliance on 
others’ epistemic guidance can be considered “a deep-seated part of our psychological 
design” (Harris, 2002, p. 316). Indeed, it is easy to think about topics that people learn 
about even when direct experience is not usually an option: germs, black holes, or the 
brain; verifying birth dates, one’s biological parents’ identity, or the shape of the earth. 
And yet children will develop understandings of all these topics. This reliance on others, 
however, does not imply that children are helplessly gullible, believing and doing 
everything that they are told; with age, children develop skills at judging the credibility of 
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potential sources (Koenig & Harris, 2005). In this work, I examine both previous findings 
that address children’s selective learning from others, as well as new horizons of research 
on people’s endorsement of others’ instruction. Specifically, I will review findings on 
children’s use of contextual information—such as an information source’s competence, 
social attributes, and motivational cues—to decide whether to accept that source’s 
teachings. I will also summarize what is currently known about individual differences in 
socio-cognitive development that affect children’s selective learning.   
1.1. LEARNING FROM OTHERS 
Humans, unlike any other species, learn to attain a goal by reproducing strategies 
previously used by their conspecifics, who they perceive as intentional agents like 
themselves. This ability has allowed for cumulative cultural learning wherein a group can 
invent symbolic artifacts that another can learn, improve and pass on to the next 
generation (Tomasello, 2000). However, this adaptive way of transmitting knowledge has 
at the very least two requirements: Firstly an individual has to be able to recognize 
another as an intentional being with whom to share goals; secondly, this individual has to 
believe that the instructed strategy is effective for obtaining the goal that is being 
pursued. For example, when trying to learn the function or location of an object, the 
individual has to recognize the instructive intention of a potential information source. 
However, it is equally important to be able to assume that the information provided is 
accurate, and that it can be implemented as an appropriate strategy to fulfill the goal of 
using or finding the object. Recently, a growing body of research has examined multiple 
factors that allow children to determine whether a source is credible and/or worth 
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learning from (e.g., Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Harris, 2007; Koenig, Clement, & 
Harris, 2004). 
1.1.1. Competence 
To date, most of the research examining children’s selective learning from others 
has used a “history of competence” methodology. Specifically, prior to testing their 
preferences children are provided with behavioral evidence of a source’s reliability in the 
task at hand (e.g., for a word learning task, showing a source labeling 
accurately/inaccurately).  
Starting in infancy, children can track and make use of a target’s apparent 
competence to inform their learning decisions. Chow, Poulin-Dubois, and Lewis (2008) 
presented 14-month-olds with a target who expressed happiness and excitement after 
looking inside a container that either had an interesting toy (reliable looker condition) or 
was empty (unreliable looker condition). The question was whether children’ gaze-
following in a subsequent task depended on their knowledge of the target’s prior 
competence, gained during the container task. Once the history of reliability had been 
established, the target leaned sideways to look at an object hidden behind a barrier that 
the children had to go around to see. Gaze following was measured by whether the infant 
proactively moved a short distance to gain visual access to the back of the barrier that the 
target’s gaze was directed to. Children in the reliable looker condition were significantly 
more likely to follow the target’s gaze than those who saw the target previously 
expressing excitement for an empty container. These results suggest that children were 
able to use the target’s apparent competence to selectively choose whose gaze to follow. 
 4 
Young children also appear to take into account a target’s competence when 
deciding whether or not to imitate an instrumental behavior. Using a procedure similar to 
the one described above, Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, and Polonia (2011) presented 14-
month-olds with a target who was portrayed as either reliable or unreliable in the 
emotional referencing task  described above. Then, the target performed an atypical 
behavior (i.e., illuminated a light using her forehead), and, after placing the light in front 
of the infant, observed whether the infant reproduced this unusual behavior. As expected, 
a greater number of children imitated the behavior when the target had been reliable 
rather than unreliable. Likewise, Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Daum (2010) found 
that 14-month-olds were more likely to imitate a target’s subsequent behavior (i.e., using 
his/her forehead to illuminate a light) when the target previously had been portrayed as 
competent (e.g., putting a shoe on the foot) as opposed to incompetent (e.g., putting a 
shoe on the hand) when using familiar objects. Finally, 16-month-olds are attentive to the 
competence of a target who labels familiar objects (e.g., a ball) truthfully or falsely; 
children will look longer (as if being more surprised) and try to correct a target more 
often if she labels an object falsely (e.g., calls the ball a “shoe”) rather than truthfully 
(e.g., calls the ball a “ball”; Koenig & Echols, 2003). 
Children’s use of competence continues to develop and to play a role in their 
learning decisions during toddlerhood. For instance, 2-year-old children become attentive 
to more subtle cues of competence such as a target’s expressed confidence when deciding 
who to imitate. Specifically, 2-year-olds will prefer to imitate a target who shows 
confidence (e.g., shoulders back, knowledgeable facial expression) as opposed to 
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uncertainty (e.g., shoulder shrugging, puzzled facial expression) when performing an 
action (e.g., using a novel tool to move other objects; Birch, Akmal & Frampton, 2010). 
Further, because of the greater understanding of verbal communication that characterizes 
this age, toddlers continue to monitor the perceived competence of targets based not only 
on targets’ actions, but also claims. For example, 24-month-olds will be less likely to 
remember novel second labels for familiar objects (e.g., using “blicket” to refer to a shoe) 
when taught by incompetent versus competent targets, that is, from a target who either 
previously labeled an initial group of familiar objects falsely (called a duck a “cat”) or 
expressed ignorance for familiar objects (“I don’t know what that is”), versus one who 
labeled the objects truthfully. However, this epistemic selectivity is still developing, as 
toddlers will sometimes accept first labels for novel objects even when taught by 
seemingly incompetent targets (Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 
2012).  
Despite 2-year-olds’ relative success in distinguishing between competent and 
incompetent targets, their selective learning is not fully developed. For example, when 
30-month-olds try to identify the location (out of three possible ones) of an object that 
they initially hid—but was later moved to another location by a second experimenter in 
their absence—they will search in the new location indicated by a bystander target, even 
when the target has offered them false information about other objects’ locations (Ganea, 
Koenig & Gordon Millett, 2011). A similar lack of selectivity (i.e., children’s 
endorsements of previously incompetent sources) is observed when false claims 
correspond with 30-month-olds’ naïve theories (i.e., an expectation that unsupported 
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objects fall straight down; Jaswal, 2010). Luckily there are strategies that can improve 
young children’s performance involving object-locating tasks, such as giving them an 
opportunity to gain confidence in their own predictions (see Jaswal, 2010; Experiment 4; 
Ma & Ganea, 2010; Experiments 2-3). 
During the preschool years, children’s attentiveness to competence as a cue for 
credibility becomes appreciably more sophisticated. Whereas 2-year-olds can keep track 
of a single labeler’s behavior (Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 
2012), 3-year-olds are able to monitor two labelers’ actions simultaneously. Further, 
these children preferentially endorse names for novel objects provided by the previously 
competent over incompetent target (e.g., Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig, 
Clement & Harris, 2004). Also, 3-year-olds remember the competence of the targets, and 
continue to use this information to guide their word learning up to a week after initial 
exposure (Corriveau & Harris, 2009a). Starting in their 4th year of life, children can 
efficiently monitor the relative competence of different targets (e.g., target 1 being a 
reliable labeler ¾ of the time vs. target 2 being reliable ¼ of the time; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig & Harris, 2007), as well as selectively imitate competent over 
incompetent targets in rule-based games (Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). 
Finally, 5- but not 4-year-olds take into account a target’s history of purposeful trickery 
to selectively learn the location of a hidden prize. Specifically, when presented with a 
target who either previously helped or tricked another player in a sticker finding game, 5-
year-olds are more likely to endorse the previously helpful target’s subsequent claims 
(Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011). 
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In addition, children are “flexible” in their attentiveness to—and inferences 
about—a source’s history of competence and credibility. For instance, Koenig and Echols 
(2003) presented 16-month-olds with a target who labeled objects (that were familiar to 
the child) either truthfully or falsely. However, the circumstances under which the target 
labeled the objects varied by visual access (i.e., the target was facing directly toward or 
away from the objects). Infants looked longer (an indication of greater surprise) when an 
untruthful target mislabeled objects that were in front versus behind him or her. 
Similarly, infants correctively labeled (i.e., attempted the “correct answer”) more often 
when a target mislabeled objects in front of him or her. Thus, by 16 months of age infants 
attend not only to unfavorable outcomes (e.g., apparent incompetence), but also to 
circumstances that explain targets’ mental states.  
Children’s sensitivity to the causes behind instances of incompetence extends to 
their learning decisions. Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009a) introduced 3- to 6-year-old 
children to a puppet with whom they played a visual identity game. In the uninformed 
condition the puppet first misidentified several hidden objects’ properties (e.g., color) 
while being unable to see the objects. In the informed condition the puppet also 
misidentified the objects’ properties, except that it had full (visual) access to the objects. 
In subsequent trials, during which the puppet was better informed, children endorsed the 
puppet’s subsequent claims more often if it had previously erred for reasonable (poorly 
informed) rather than unreasonable (erring while fully informed) causes (but see 
Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009b, for different outcomes in novel labeling tasks).  
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Interestingly, children’s apparent reasoning about knowledge states also applies to 
instances of positive outcomes (e.g., competence): 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-
olds, differentially favor a target who proved to be competent by its own merits (labeling 
objects truthfully without help) over another who appeared competent because of the 
assistance of a third party (someone whispered to it the correct labels for the objects; 
Einav & Robinson, 2011). Finally, children are attentive to indirect cues of competence, 
such as expertise (Sobel & Corriveau, 2010): Four-year-olds heard a target correctly 
predict the function of one type of object (e.g., those activating a machine’s green light) 
but claiming ignorance about other objects (i.e., responded “I don’t know” for objects 
that activated the machine’s red light). Children endorsed subsequent information in a 
different domain (e.g., names of objects) when provided by the target, but only if related 
to the target’s particular domain of knowledge (e.g., the “green” expert provides labels 
for objects that trigger the green light). 
In summary, from very early in development children show the ability to be 
attentive to a target’s competence. By 14 months of age children start making use of this 
information to decide who to imitate and learn from. In the next 3 to 5 years of life 
children’s ability to infer credibility from competence increases significantly, allowing 
them to monitor several targets at once, retain this information longer, prefer helpful over 
deceiving sources, and flexibly reason about causes for erring. 
1.1.2. Social cues 
 The aforementioned studies make an invaluable contribution to the literature on 
children’s selective learning from others. However, in those studies it is assumed that 
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people will have access to critical information such as a source’s previous history of 
reliability. Though ideal, in real life it is often not possible to determine if someone has 
been consistently competent in the past (e.g., when asking strangers for directions to a 
conference in an unfamiliar location). A number of studies have shown that when 
uncertain about a source’s actual competence, children do not perform randomly, but 
instead make use of social cues such as majority consensus (Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 
2009), and familiarity (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b) to decide from whom to learn. 
 Evidence of children’s receptiveness to social attributes (indirectly) related to 
credibility can be found during the preschool years. For instance, 3-year-olds will pay 
close attention to social consensus (i.e., three targets overtly supporting a statement vs. 
one dissenter who does not), and will preferentially accept information offered by non-
dissenting over dissenting targets (Corriveau et al, 2009). Similarly, when deciding who 
to trust 4-year-olds will take into account whether bystanders nod their heads in 
agreement or shake their heads in disagreement when listening to each of two targets 
provide contrasting information; moreover, children will prefer to learn from the socially 
‘endorsed’ target even when the bystanders are no longer present (Fusaro & Harris, 
2008). Finally, children seem to be influenced by a model’s ‘prestige’; that is, after 
watching bystanders stand between two targets and preferentially attend to only one of 
the targets, 3- to 4-year-olds will take into account the targets’ spectators (or lack thereof) 
and will prefer to imitate the ‘prestigious’ over the non-prestigious target’s actions 
(Chudek, Heller, Birch & Henrich, 2012). 
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 In addition to paying attention to social cues based on others’ feedback (e.g., 
consensus), children also use social cues that are inherently characteristic of source, such 
as familiarity and similarity. For example, when faced with interpersonally similar and 
dissimilar sources whose reliability is unknown, 3- to 5-year-olds will preferentially 
accept information provided by similar over dissimilar targets (Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 
2013). Other instances in which children effectively use social attributes to infer a 
target’s credibility include preferentially learning from benevolent over malevolent 
(Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), familiar over unfamiliar (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau & 
Harris, 2009b), native-accented over foreign-accented (Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 
2011), and adult over child targets (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken 
& Tomasello, 2010, imitation task; but see VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009; Rakoczy, 
Hamann, Warneken & Tomasello, 2010, labeling task, for contrasting findings).   
Arguably, children’s systematic preference for learning from targets with these attributes 
can be an adaptive strategy, due to socially proximal targets (e.g., familiar, similar) being 
considered more likely to cooperate (Antal, Ohtsuki, Wakeley, Taylor, & Nowaka, 2009) 
and less likely to deceive (Whiten & Byrne, 1988) than distal ones. 
In summary, in the absence of reliability information, even preschoolers are able 
to infer a source’s credibility from its social attributes; that is, they tend to base their 
learning decisions on social cues readily available in the environment, such as consensus 
and interpersonal similarity. 
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1.1.3. Motivations 
 Motives are another important piece of information that people are highly 
attentive to when assessing credibility. For instance, political candidates who appear to 
act against self-interests (e.g., praise an opponent) are considered more credible than 
those who act in self-serving ways (e.g., attack an opponent or praise themselves; Combs 
& Keller, 2010). Further, adults are warier about claims made by sources when monetary 
self-interest is involved. Specifically, adults are more likely to accept information from a 
partner about the outcome of a coin flip when interests are common (i.e., both benefit 
from the participant making a correct guess about the outcome) rather than conflicting 
(i.e., only one of the partners benefits from a correct guess; Boudreau, McCubbins, & 
Coulson, 2009; also see Balliet & Van Lange, 2012, for a review). Whether children 
effectively use motives to infer credibility is perhaps the least explored inquiry in the 
selective learning literature. As briefly mentioned, there have been studies testing 
whether children differentially learn from helping over deceiving targets (Vanderbilt et 
al, 2011; see also Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).  
The main limitation of these studies is that, because children have key 
information about a partner’s previous actions or reputation (e.g., having deceived 
another partner during a game), children’s learning choices could be explained by 
behavioral rather than motive based inferences. Specifically, when competing in a game, 
children could associate the other player with a particular outcome and choose 
accordingly (e.g., the other player always points to the wrong box; I should choose the 
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opposite). Indeed, there is initial evidence that children place more weight on outcome 
versus intent information (Liu, Vanderbilt, & Heyman, 2013). 
 To my knowledge, only two studies have presented children with motivational 
cues exclusively (i.e., without also providing behavioral evidence)—hence avoiding the 
above ambiguity when interpreting the results. In these studies children are simply asked 
to make explicit judgments about others’ credibility: when presented with scenarios of 
nonmaterial gains (e.g., social desirability), even preschoolers may judge as less credible 
someone who acts in line with (e.g., reports feeling sick, does not want to go to camp) 
rather than against (e.g., reports feeling sick, wants to go to camp) self-interests (Gee & 
Heyman, 2007). Conversely, when evaluating scenarios with material rewards (e.g., there 
is a prize for winning a race), children younger than 7 years fail to show an understanding 
that self-interest affects credibility; that is, 5- to 6-year-olds judge as more credible 
someone who makes a self-regarding statement (e.g., claiming to have won a race whose 
outcome was ambiguous, to win a prize) rather than against self-interests (e.g., claiming 
to have lost the close race; Mills & Keil, 2005).  
Although valuable, these findings are constrained in that children’s explicit 
awareness of a source’s credibility does not guarantee that they selectively learn from 
that source (Mills, 2013). For example, Vanderbilt et al (2011) found that 4-year-olds 
identified informants who previously provided the correct (vs. incorrect) location of 
stickers as more motivated to help (i.e., explicit awareness). However, they failed to 
integrate that knowledge to avoid learning from deceitful sources (i.e., continued to 
accept misleading information from that source). Thus, it remains unknown whether 
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children demonstrate behaviorally (i.e., by deciding whether or not to endorse a claim) an 
understanding of the relation between self-interest and credibility. This is important 
because, in the real world, judgments of credibility are typically revealed through actual 
behavior. A goal of this dissertation was to test whether children’s learning decisions are 
influenced by self-interest cues exclusively. 
1.1.4. Individual differences 
To date very few studies have examined individual differences in socio-cognitive 
development that affect children’s selective learning. Further, to my knowledge these 
studies have focused solely on the relation between theory of mind development and 
selective learning (e.g., Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Pasquini et al., 2007; Vanderbilt et al., 
2011). For example, Fusaro and Harris (2008) found that children who performed better 
on false belief tasks were more likely to use an informant’s previous reliability to 
evaluate that informant’s future claims (but see Pasquini et al., 2007, for null findings). In 
light of this limitation in the literature, another goal when designing my dissertation was 
to identify additional socio-cognitive abilities that develop to support people’s motive-
based credibility inferences. 
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2. Experiment 1 
A first experiment was conducted to validate a plausible methodology for testing 
whether children’s learning and instructive behaviors are influenced by self-interest cues 
exclusively. Building on a procedure used by Boudreau and colleagues with adults (2009, 
see above), participants played a finding game with (what they believed was) another 
player. Half of the time the participants served as informants for hidden prizes’ locations; 
for the remaining half the “other” player was the informant. Informants were incentivized 
via reward rules to be truthful or deceitful. The assumption was that without a basis for 
pre-judgment (e.g., informants’ trickery, negative traits), informants’ current credibility 
potentially could be inferred from reward rules—leading participants to believe the other 
player less often if interests conflicted. When acting as informants, it was expected that 
participants’ instructions would be less truthful when interests conflicted. 
There are two possibilities regarding the age at which children are able to 
integrate self-interest information to their learning and instructive behaviors. Firstly, 7-
year-olds (the earliest age at which children show an understanding of the relation 
between reward-based self-interest and credibility; Mills & Keil, 2005) could selectively 
learn from informants guided exclusively by self-interest information. Conversely, it may 
be too cognitively taxing for 7-year-olds to detect, remember, and integrate these cues 
into their learning decisions (see Vanderbilt et al, 2011). These two possibilities also 
apply to children’s instructions when acting as informants. To distinguish these 
possibilities, 7-year-olds participated in the study. Nine-year-olds were included for their 
relatively greater capacity to integrate multiple cues (e.g., Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 
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2010). Adults were selected for their documented success in similar tasks (e.g., 
Boudreau, McCubbins, & Coulson, 2009). 
2.1. METHOD 
2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight 7-year-olds (Mage = 7 years 4 months; range: 6 years 1 months – 7 
years 10 months; 14 females), twenty-eight 9-year-olds (Mage = 9 years 2 months; range: 
8 years 1 months – 9 years 11 months; 14 females), and forty (university student) adults 
(Mage = 19 years; 20 females) were recruited using a university’s participant databases. 
The majority of participants were Caucasian and from middle-class families. 
2.1.2. Materials 
 “Smarties” candy and tickets to $25/$50 Amazon.com gift card drawings were 
used as prizes for children and adults, respectively. Participants sent messages or guessed 
about prizes’ location via a computer keyboard with a blue and a red key, which matched 
the colors of two origami boxes used to hide prizes. 
2.1.3. Procedure 
 Participants played a game consisting of four within-subjects conditions: guesser-
common interests, guesser-conflicting interests, witness-common interests, and witness-
conflicting interests.  
Participants played each of two separate roles: witness and guesser. When in the 
witness role, participants observed the experimenter hide a prize (candy/drawing ticket) 
under a blue or red box, and sent a text message (via the computer) to a guesser about the 
 prize’s location. Participants in the guesser role had to decide
witness’s message—where they thought the prize was actually hidden (see Figure 1). 
Witnesses and guessers initially
information. 
Figure 1. Sample sequence for participants in the role of witness (top) and guesser 
(bottom). 
16 
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Additionally, there were two reward rules/incentives: common and conflicting 
interests. When interests were common, every time guessers selected the correct box, 
both guessers and witnesses earned an item. If guessers selected the incorrect box, neither 
player earned an item. When interests conflicted, the item was contested, so that 
witnesses only earned an item if guessers chose the wrong box, and guessers only earned 
one when correct. Participants were led to believe that they were playing, during each 
trial, with an unknown peer seated in a separate lab room who played the opposite role 
(e.g., guesser if the participant was a witness); in actuality, the stimuli were 
preprogrammed in the computer.  
Before playing, participants learned that performance feedback (e.g., who won 
prizes during each trial) would be provided only at the end of the experiment. Thus, 
deciding to believe or cooperate with others was based solely on inference of motives and 
its relation to credibility/expectations. To control for effects of experience with the task, 
an equal number of participants played four rounds (10 trials each) in one of two 
randomly assigned sequences: a) guesser-common, guesser-conflicting, witness-common, 
witness-conflicting, or b) witness-common, witness-conflicting, guesser-common, 
guesser-conflicting interests.  
Conflicting trials always came last in hopes of obtaining the most accurate (i.e., 
still fresh in memory) explicit judgments possible at the end of the experiment. 
Specifically, right after the game was over, the experimenter explicitly reminded 
participants about the conflicting reward rules. Then, the experimenter claimed to be “just 
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curious” about participants’ strategies during their last round of trials (which was always 
played under the conflicting rules). Half of the participants were asked to explain their 
decisions when guessing (“Did you sometimes believe the other player’s message? Why? 
Did you think the other player was trying to trick you or not really? Why?”), whereas the 
other half was asked about sending messages (“Did you sometimes send the right 
answer? Why? I am just curious!”) This explored whether guessers expected the other 
player to trick them, and whether witnesses intended to deceive the other player during 
conflicting trials. 
2.1.3.1. Guesser: common/conflicting interests  
Participants learned that prizes would be hidden in the other player’s room by 
another experimenter. They were told that every time a prize was hidden, the other player 
would send a message that “may or may not be correct,” and it was the participant’s job 
to guess where the prize was hidden. The experimenter explained the reward rules, 
mentioned that the other player knew them too, and quizzed participants to ensure that 
they understood the rules by asking: “Can you repeat back the rules?”; “What happens 
when you guess correctly/incorrectly?” No participant in any condition needed more than 
two repetitions of the rules to answer these questions correctly. The experimenter then 
left the room to provide participants with privacy. 
2.1.3.2. Witness: common/conflicting interests 
The experimenter brought prizes (e.g., Smarties) and hiding boxes, and informed 
participants they would be sending messages to the other player—the guesser—about the 
prizes’ location. The experimenter explained the rules (which the other player supposedly 
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also knew), and sat facing away from the participant, positioned so the participant could 
observe the hiding. The experimenter said to participants that it was fine whether they 
“sent the right or wrong answer.” 
2.1.3.3. Script excerpt for explaining the game rules 
Provided below is an excerpt of the wording used to explain the common and 
conflicting rules of the game when participants played as witnesses. The rules were 
explained to participants after they were trained on using the computer, and told that 
another player and experimenter were in a separate room. 
For the common interests round, participants were told: “Now it is time to start 
playing. These are the rules of the game: Every time the other player guesses correctly 
where I hid the candy both you and the other player will get a piece of candy. Every time 
the other player guesses wrong, neither of you will get a piece of candy. Can you repeat 
back the rules? What happens when the other player guesses correctly/incorrectly? The 
other player also knows these are the game rules.” 
Then, for the conflicting interests round, participants were told: “I will continue to 
hide candy, but the rules have changed for this new round. Now, every time the other 
player guesses correctly where I hid the candy only the other player will get a piece of 
candy. And every time the other player guesses wrong only you will get a piece of candy. 
Can you repeat back the rules? What happens when the other player guesses 
correctly/incorrectly? The other player also knows these new rules.” 
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2.2. RESULTS 
To evaluate participants’ performance, every time participants collaborated (i.e., 
guessers endorsed witnesses’ testimony, and/or witnesses shared truthful information), 
their response was coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise; maximum score = 10, per within-subjects 
condition). Preliminary analyses indicated no age differences within the child sample (p > 
.10, for all comparisons), so 7- and 9-year-olds were combined into a single child group 
to increase statistical power. 
 Due to guessers and witnesses’ responses not being normally distributed, I 
analyzed them using separate repeated-measures binary logistic regressions via the 
Generalized Estimating Equations procedure (GEE; see Hardin & Hilbe, 2003). 
Children’s trial-by-trial responses served as the dependent measure, evaluated as a 
function of interest (within-subjects: common, conflicting), age (children, adults), and 
role order (guesser first, witness first). See Figure 2 for participants’ trial-by-trial 
responses. 
2.2.1. Selective learning  
When in the guesser role, there were main effects of interest condition, Wald 2 
(1, N = 96) = 91.93, p < .001, age, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 8.03, p = .005, and role order,  
Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 11.84, p = .001, as well as interest x age, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 
30.23, p < .001, and interest x role interactions, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 15.28, p < .001. 
Regarding the first interaction, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
showed that children, p < .001, like adults, p < .001, believed the witnesses’ messages 
more often in the common versus conflicting interest condition. However, children were 
 significantly less likely than adults to believe a partner with common interests, 
There was a nonsignificant trend for children to endorse a partner’s cl
conflicting interests condition more frequently than adults, 
Figure 2. Number of guessers who believed their partner’
and B), and of witnesses who sent truthful messag
C and D). 
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 Regarding the interest x role interaction, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons indicated that participants believed their partners’ claims more often if 
interests were common rather than conflicting. This applied both when playing initially 
as witnesses (common: Mmarginal = .94, SE = .018 vs. conflicting: Mmarginal = .48, SE = 
.040), p < .001, and initially as guessers (common: Mmarginal = .76, SE = .036 vs. 
conflicting: Mmarginal = .50, SE = .036), p < .001. Further, when having common interests, 
participants believed their partners more frequently if playing initially as witnesses rather 
than guessers, p < .001. Their responses did not differ by role during conflicting trials, p 
= 1. 
2.2.2. Truthful instructing 
When in the witness role, there were main effects of interest condition, Wald 2 
(1, N = 96) = 41.09, p < .001, and age, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 23.75, p < .001, as well as 
an interest x age interaction, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 19.05, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons showed that both children, p = .009, and adults, p < .001, sent more 
truthful messages to the other player when having common versus conflicting interests. 
However, children sent truthful messages to a partner with common interests less 
frequently than adults, p < .001. There were no differences in children and adults’ 
responses during conflicting trials, p = 1. 
2.2.3. Relation between learning and instructing behaviors 
When interests were common, trust and trustworthiness behaviors correlated 
positively for children, rs(56) = .70, p < .001, but not adults, rs(40) = .066, p = .69. When 
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interests conflicted, correlations were marginally significant for children, rs(56) = .23, p = 
.091, but not adults, rs(40) = -.084, p = .61. 
2.2.4. Changes in behavior over time 
 We calculated differential scores for each condition and role by subtracting the 
first two trials from the last two (score range: -2 to 2). Then we compared each score to 
zero via t-tests, to determine any changes over time. Children’s behavior did not change 
over time, either for common or conflicting interests (p > .13 for all comparisons). 
Adults’ behavior changed only as guessers during conflicting trials: adult’s trust 
increased as the experiment went on, M = 0.25, SD = 0.74, t(39) = 2.13, p = .040, d = 
0.34. 
2.2.5. Explanation probe results 
 After the game was over, the experimenter explicitly reminded participants about 
the conflicting reward rules. Then, the experimenter claimed to be “just curious” about 
participants’ strategies during their last round of trials. 
2.2.5.1. Coding and reliability 
 Participants’ open-ended responses were initially classified by the first author into 
two groups: those in which participants spontaneously mentioned either their or the 
partner’s deceptive intent (e.g., to trick, confuse, mislead) and those in which deceptive 
intent was not mentioned. The responses that did not mention deceptive intent were later 
classified into four general categories: personal strategies, generalized trust, morality-
driven, and other (e.g., because the other player had good vision). The open-ended 
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responses of 32 randomly selected participants also were coded independently by two 
coders blind to condition and research question. Their choices demonstrated an average 
92.2% agreement with the first author.    
2.2.5.2. Guessers’ patterns of responses  
 An examination of guessers’ actual behavior during their last conflicting interests 
round revealed that: the majority of participants (children: 77%, adults: 88%) endorsed 
the partner’s message at least once and discarded it at least once, followed by those who 
always (children: 21%, adults: 5%) or never did (children: 2%, adults: 8%). A minority of 
child guessers used easily identifiable strategies during conflicting trials such as color 
switching (e.g., red, blue, red, blue, etc.; n = 3) and partial endorsing (e.g., endorsing 1st 
and 2nd texts, choosing opposite for 3rd and 4th, endorsing 5th and 6th, etc.; n = 1, or, 
choosing opposite for initial 5 texts, endorsing last 5; n = 1). No child endorsed only one 
color (e.g., always blue) during the 10 trials.  
2.2.5.3. Guessers’ justifications 
Endorsing the message of someone who benefits from one’s errors, such as when 
playing with conflicting interests, could be explained by multiple reasons: confusion, 
wanting equal distribution of prizes, recursive thinking (i.e., player A thinking about what 
player B thinks player A is thinking), etc. After the game was over participants were 
explicitly reminded of the game rules, and then asked about the strategies they used 
during the last conflicting interest round. Half of the participants played their last 
conflicting round as guessers, and thus were asked about their choices in the guesser role. 
Participants were asked whether they sometimes believed the other player’s message, and 
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whether they thought the other player was trying to trick them. Five children did not 
respond. Almost all adults, and about a third of children (adults: 18 out of 20; children: 8 
out of 23) spontaneously justified endorsing the message as a product of the other 
player’s intentions (e.g., “Sometimes, because the other player could send the right one to 
make me think it was the wrong one”). Children’s other common responses included 
following their own strategies (n = 5; e.g., “Sometimes, because I just followed my own 
pattern, and sometimes my pattern was the same as the player’s message”), and 
generalized trust (n = 5: “e.g., I believed it all the time, because I always told the truth to 
the other player”). 
When explicitly asked whether and why they thought the player sometimes tried 
to trick them, the majority of guessers (adults: 18 out of 20; children: 18 out of 23) 
expressed suspicions about the other player’s intent (e.g., “Yes, the other player 
sometimes sent the wrong one to win more candy”; “Sometimes, because when I was 
sending messages I sent the right one sometimes thinking the player would not believe 
me”). The proportion of participants explicitly expressing suspicions differed from 
chance (i.e., 50%; Binomial tests, children: p = .011, adults: p < .001) when compared to 
the proportion who did not express any suspicion. There were no age differences; that is, 
children were as likely as adults to express suspicions as guessers, U = 203.00, p = .30. 
2.2.5.4. Witnesses’ patterns of responses 
Participants’ behavior in the witness-conflicting interests condition showed a 
similar pattern: the majority of participants (children: 73%, adults: 80%) sent the correct 
answer to the partner at least once, whereas the rest either always (children: 21%, adults: 
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18%) or never (children: 6%, adults: 2%) did. A minority of child witnesses followed 
specific patterns during conflicting trials such as color switching (e.g., red, blue, red, 
blue, etc.; n = 2) and partial truthfulness (e.g., correctly reporting 1st and 2nd locations, 
then wrong location for 3rd and 4th, etc.; n = 1). No child sent the other player only one 
color for all 10 trials. 
2.2.5.5. Witnesses’ justifications 
Sharing truthful information with someone who, by guessing correctly, prevents 
one from winning is also subject to multiple potential reasons. Half of the participants 
played their last conflicting round as witnesses. These participants were explicitly 
reminded of the conflicting rules, and then asked whether and why they sent truthful 
messages. One child did not respond. The majority of participants (adults: 20 out of 20; 
children: 19 out of 27) described sending truthful information to confuse the guesser 
(e.g., “I sent a pattern of two red, two blue, to make it more difficult for the player”; “If I 
sent the right box, the other player would think it is the wrong one”; “If I only send the 
wrong box the player just has to choose the opposite”). The proportion of child 
participants who expressed intent to confuse marginally differed from chance (i.e., 50%; 
Binomial tests, children: p = .052, adults: p < .001) when compared against all other 
explanations that did not involve confusion intent. Those who did not express intentions 
to confuse the player (n = 8) provided alternate explanations for sending truthful 
messages during conflicting trials (e.g., “I did not want to take all the candy from the 
other player”; “I am a bad liar”). Children were less likely than adults to express intent to 
confuse as witnesses, U = 190.00, p = .008, r = .39. 
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2.3. DISCUSSION 
 The main goal of Experiment 1 was to determine if, without behavioral evidence 
of a partner’s prior deception, children’s learning and instructive behaviors were 
influenced by self-interest cues. Like adults, 7- and 9-year-olds endorsed messages (as 
guessers) and shared truthful information (as witnesses) more frequently if having 
common rather than conflicting interests. To my knowledge this is the first empirical 
demonstration of children’s ability to flexibly vary their learning and instructive 
behaviors, grounded exclusively on self-interest based inferences. Specifically, in the 
current study children did not receive any details about their partner’s prior or ongoing 
motives/behavior; they did not know if, by sending the right or wrong answer, they were 
effectively winning or losing. They had to take a leap of faith and hope that the other 
player believed or doubted them based solely on their common knowledge of the rules. 
On the one hand, these results of inference-driven selectivity complement research 
showing children’s selectivity when epistemic (e.g., Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; 
Koenig, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012) and social (e.g., Corriveau, Fusaro, & 
Harris, 2009; Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Reyes-Jaquez & Echols, 2013) 
information is provided.  
However, a potential implication of these findings is that even 9-year-olds have 
yet to fully master the art of selectively learning from—and cooperating with—others. 
Comparing children and adults’ behaviors showed that children were less trusting/truthful 
than adults with partners who had common interests. These findings are important, for 
they advance the thesis that the developmental challenge of integrating motivational cues 
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into learning decisions entails not only becoming skeptical of those with conflicting 
interests, but also increasingly confident that people with common interests intend to 
help. This thesis is partly compatible with prior research evaluating children’s selective 
learning: Vanderbilt et al. (2011) found that even when children received information 
from a source with an impeccable helping history (i.e., someone who had previously 
helped 2 out of 2 people), 4- and 5-year-olds’ endorsement of that informant’s claims was 
“not at ceiling” (p. 1376). Importantly, additional research is needed to discard potential 
alternate explanations for the findings that support the contention outlined. 
A limitation that pertains to Experiment 1 and other studies is that there has been 
little exploration of mechanisms behind children’s motive-based credulity and 
skepticism. This shortage represents a valuable opportunity for future research. A first 
step before exploring potential mechanisms is agreeing on what it means to be credulous 
or skeptical. As stated in the introduction, existing behavioral studies provide children 
with explicit information about cooperativeness such as a source’s reputation or prior 
trickery. In these studies, children are expected to predict trait-like consistency in the 
source’s behavior (e.g., once a liar, always a liar) and mistrust that source. Specifically, if 
a source is presented as a liar or mean (e.g., Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), or as someone 
who previously tricked (e.g., Jaswal et al., 2010; Vanderbilt et al., 2011), children should 
always mistrust it. Such a task requirement for skepticism can represent a challenge for 
younger children, who sometimes predict change in a person’s future behavior, regardless 
of his or her past behavior (e.g., Kalish, 2002). This requirement in learning tasks may 
also explain some of the developmental differences in behavioral dissociations when 
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compared to inferential tasks. In particular, inferential tasks may not require person-
specific associations; from the incentives alone it is possible to deduce that anyone who 
benefits from one’s success is likely to cooperate. 
Further, endorsing an ill-intended source at or above chance levels is typically 
considered indicative of credulity. However, as Experiment 1 shows, even adults consider 
it “sound” to endorse a proportion of claims made by someone who is expected to 
deceive due to a game’s incentives. It has been documented that younger children 
struggle when playing as informants in learning tasks that require recursive thinking (e.g., 
Shultz & Cloghesy, 1981). There also is indirect behavioral evidence from a guessing 
task that younger children fail to employ a recursive strategy (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). 
Still, it would be useful to directly test whether individual differences in younger 
children’s nascent recursive awareness predict their performance as guessers in a limited 
resources game. 
Based on the results outlined above it is also important to account for contextual 
factors in children’s apparent credulity and skepticism. For instance, the means of 
transmitting information (e.g., spoken, written), the status of the source (e.g., an authority 
figure), and related social expectations (e.g., obedience, politeness) appears to play a role 
in children’s trust behavior: Jaswal et al. (2010) found that children who received 
misleading testimony via arrows or an audio recording were more skeptical than those 
who received it from a person they could see and hear. Potentially, our participants in 
Experiment 1 benefited from playing with a peer, not being able to see the partner when 
sending misleading information, and of having received the testimony via text when 
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deciding whether to trust it. These methodological considerations should prove useful 
when interpreting existing work and designing future studies. 
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3. Experiment 2 
3.1. RATIONALE 
 In Experiment 1, it was first documented that children could take into account 
motivational cues to inform their learning decisions. However, at least two central, 
interrelated inquiries remained unaddressed: (a) why are children not fully capitalizing on 
instances of common ground? and (b) what are potential socio-cognitive predictors of 
adult-like performance in children? In other words, what is it that develops that allows 
adults, but not some children, to deem a source as credible in situations where both 
parties benefit? 
 To address these questions I tested whether various socio-cognitive skills are 
potentially needed to detect and take advantage of common ground: participants’ working 
memory, recursive awareness, interpretive theory of mind (ToM), and generalized 
mistrust. The first two were expected to potentially aid in the detection of common 
ground, whereas the latter two could arguably interfere with this goal. All four were 
measured during Experiment 2 to be used as potential predictors of performance. 
3.1.1. Memory constraints 
Participants in Experiment 1 had to store and manipulate multiple pieces of 
information: the game rules, current round, last/current box color, common knowledge 
between them and the partner, etc. Working memory (i.e., the ability to maintain and 
manipulate information) undergoes significant changes from childhood to adulthood 
(e.g., Huizinga, Dolan, & Molen, 2006). It is possible that memory constraints were 
hindering children’s ability to learn selectively. Due to having to remember both the 
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game rules and the answer provided by the source, children may have been more prone to 
erring in their choices than adults, whose memory capacity is greatly developed. To 
account for this possibility, in Experiment 2 children’s recall was measured both before 
and after each round. Additionally, children’s working memory capacity was assessed. 
3.1.2. Recursive awareness 
Arguably, participants benefitted from thinking about partners’ potential thoughts 
and intentions, such as entertaining the possibility that: “My partner is thinking that I am 
thinking that he is going to trick me, so he may send the correct box.” Children 
eventually realize that people can infer other individuals’ intentions—including other 
people being able to infer children’s own intent. This understanding of recursive 
awareness tends to improve with age (e.g., Shultz & Cloghesy, 1981). Arguably, this 
ability is central in making use of self-interest cues to infer credibility; to the degree that 
children cannot conclude that the other player (or anyone else) is able to predict their 
intentions, they should be less likely to trust that s/he will believe and/or help them. 
3.1.3. Interpretive theory of mind 
 When a stimulus is ambiguous, it is reasonable for different individuals to reach 
different interpretations of it. This appreciation of the interpretive nature of the knowing 
process appears around age 7 (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). Recent findings 
suggest that, around the same age at which children begin to show an awareness that 
people can have diverse interpretations, they also tend to overlook that people can think 
alike. For example, Lagattuta, Sayfan & Blattman (2010) presented children with two 
characters, one of whom previously saw a full picture of an image. The image was then 
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occluded, leaving only a window revealing a small (but informative) part of the 
illustration (e.g., if a giraffe was pictured, the window showed the giraffe’s head). When 
asked what each character would think the illustration was when they saw the occluded 
image, 7- to 9-year-olds often claimed that the characters would interpret the picture’s 
identity differently. The authors argue that children of this age might have an over-
interpretive ToM, which explains why they sometimes fail to recognize common ground 
(i.e., both characters could identify the picture by just looking at the non-occluded 
window).  
It is possible that some children over-interpret what the other player might think 
when listening to the rules, reaching conclusions such as: “We both heard the same rules, 
but unlike me, he might not realize that cooperating is beneficial.” In other words, some 
participants may suspect that, even though both they and the other player listened to the 
same rules, there is no guarantee that both are interpreting the rules similarly.    
3.1.4. Generalized (mis)trust 
 Children often exhibit an over-reliance on their limited knowledge and experience 
when making judgments. For instance, when denying the existence of novel entities (e.g., 
a galah—a real but unfamiliar animal), children spontaneously justify these judgments by 
citing prior experience (e.g., “I’ve never heard of them before; I doubt they exist”; 
Woolley, Ma, & Lopez-Mobilia, 2011). In Experiment 1, adults may have overridden any 
prejudgment about their partner by integrating motivational information (e.g., self-
interests). Conversely, children’s documented over-reliance on prior knowledge and 
experience could have prevented them from doing so, leading some of them to 
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conclusions such as: “Regardless of the game rules, some people just like to have fun by 
tricking others.” Arguably, the more experience children have had with people benefiting 
them, the greater trust they might have in others, and vice versa. Thus, children’s 
generalized (mis)trust may have potentially affected their beliefs about an individual’s 
willingness to cooperate, even when both individuals might benefit. 
3.1.5. Stimuli properties 
A final modification to the procedure was made to the stimuli used. In Experiment 
1 adults played the game to earn tickets. This prize is sensitive to quantity in that the 
more tickets one gets the higher the probability of winning the drawing. Children, 
however, played the game for candy—a concrete reward whose quantity did not affect 
the outcome of the game in the same way that tickets did for adults. To place children in 
a more comparable reward situation to that of adults, in Experiment 2 children earned 
tokens (as opposed to candy) exchangeable for various prizes. To motivate children to 
maximize their gains, the acquisition of toys at the end of the game was dependent on the 
number of tokens they had earned. 
In sum, in Experiment 2 I investigated potential factors that could predict self-
interest-based, adult-like inferences about an individual’s credibility. I measured 
children’s working memory, recursive awareness, interpretive ToM, and generalized 
mistrust. I expected that children’s ability to take full advantage of instances of common 
ground would be positively related to their recursive awareness and second order 
reasoning. Specifically, children who demonstrated high working memory and recursive 
reasoning would perform at comparable levels to adults in the finding game. In addition, I 
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expected that children who exhibited an over-interpretive ToM and/or generalized 
mistrust toward others would perform more poorly in the finding game than children who 
did not exhibit those characteristics.  
3.2. METHOD 
3.2.1. Participants 
The final sample consisted of 40 children (Mage = 8 years 8 months; range: 7 years 
2 months – 10 years 9 months; 21 females) who were recruited using a university’s 
participant database. The majority of participants were Caucasian and from middle-class 
families. An additional 11 children who participated were excluded either due to 
experimenter error (4) or because they did not complete all the measures (7). 
3.2.2. Materials  
 Golden tokens were used as exchangeable prizes. Participants guessed about 
prizes’ location via a computer keyboard with a blue and a red key, which matched the 
colors of two origami boxes that were used to hide the tokens. Additionally, the following 
measures were used for assessing potential performance predictors (see appendices for 
detailed descriptions and illustrations): 
3.2.2.1. Working memory 
Children’s working memory was assessed via the Digit Span subtest of the second 
edition of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-Revised, Wechsler, 1974). 
Children heard a series of numbers, and then had to repeat back these numbers. In the 
first phase, children repeated the numbers in the order that they heard them. During a 
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second phase, they had to reverse the order of the numbers. The list increased in 
difficulty each round by adding additional digits. 
3.2.2.2. Recursive awareness 
Following a procedure by Oppenheimer (1986; see also Miller et al, 1970), 
children listened to descriptions of events (e.g., “The boy is thinking that he is thinking of 
the girl thinking of herself”). The experimenter then presented multiple pictures and 
asked the child to select which picture matched the verbal description. Note that only a 
subset of the items was used so as to decrease the time it took to complete this assessment 
(see Appendix). Some items measured general theory of mind, whereas others directly 
addressed children’s reasoning of recursive loops. 
3.2.2.3. Interpretive ToM 
Following a procedure similar to Lagattuta et al. (2010), children were presented 
with pictures that were covered with “occluders” that still revealed identifiable parts of 
what was pictured (e.g., a giraffe’s head). Participants then predicted how three 
characters—one character who had previously seen the full picture and two who had 
not—would interpret the “obstructed” drawings.   
3.2.2.4. Generalized mistrust 
Children’s trust was measured via a subset of items taken from Rotenberg’s trust 
scale (see Rotenberg et al., 2005; as well as Appendix). Children rated, on a scale from 1 
– 4, how likely it was that people’s statements were trustworthy. Some items presented 
neutral scenarios with no clear outcomes (e.g., “Lorraine’s father said that he would take 
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her to the cinema on Saturday. How likely is it that Lorraine’s father will take her to the 
cinema?”) A second group of items more openly described negative outcomes (i.e., 
“Charlotte asks her father if she can borrow his fishing rod. Her father says he has lent it 
to someone else. How likely is it that her father has lent the fishing rod to someone 
else?”)  
3.2.3. Procedure 
 Participants played a game primarily consisting of two within-subjects conditions: 
guesser-common interests and guesser-conflicting interests (the order was 
counterbalanced). This decision of focusing primarily on the guessing role was made to 
keep the experiment from becoming unbearably lengthy for child participants. However, 
to provide participants with some practice with the rules, and to make the role of their 
partner (i.e., the witness) more concrete, initially all participants played the game as 
witnesses themselves. After playing very briefly as witnesses, participants learned that 
the other player would now observe the experimenter hide a token under a blue or red 
box, just like they had done. The other player would then be the one sending them a text 
message (via the computer) about the token’s location. Participants had to decide—after 
receiving the other player’s message—where they thought the prize was actually hidden. 
Participants learned that it was up to the other player to send true or false information.  
Additionally, there were two reward rules/incentives: common and conflicting 
interests. When interests were common, every time the participants selected the correct 
box, both the participants and the other player earned an item. If participants selected the 
incorrect box, nobody earned an item. When interests conflicted, the item was contested, 
 38 
so that the other player only earned an item if participants chose the wrong box, and 
participants only earned one when correct. Participants were asked to recall the rules of 
the game both before and after each round, including when practicing as witnesses. 
Participants were led to believe that they were playing, during each trial, with an 
unknown peer; in actuality, the stimuli were preprogrammed in the computer. 
Participants initially played five trials with common and five trials with conflicting 
reward rules as witnesses (10 total). Then, they played 20 trials with common and 20 
trials with conflicting reward rules as guessers (40 total). 
After the finding game was over, the experimenter explicitly reminded 
participants about the common reward rules. Then, the experimenter claimed to be “just 
curious” about whether and why participants thought that their partner tried to trick them: 
“Did you think the other player was trying to trick you or not really? Why is that?” These 
prompts were done to determine what expectations children had about others during 
common trials. Finally, children engaged in a series of tasks. Participants’ performance in 
these tasks determined their working memory, recursive awareness, interpretive ToM, 
and generalized mistrust (see appendices, for a more detailed description of each task). 
3.3. RESULTS 
 The coding method for each of the variables measured is presented below, 
followed by the statistical analyses. 
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3.3.1. Coding method 
3.3.1.1. Finding game 
Every time that participants endorsed the partner’s testimony, their response was 
coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise; maximum score = 20, per reward rules condition). Then, a 
differential score was computed by subtracting their scores during the common trials 
from their scores during the conflicting trials (common – conflicting trials = differential 
score). Thus, a positive differential score would imply that children, like adults would, 
trusted the partner more often during common than conflicting trials. A negative 
differential score would reveal that children trusted the partner more frequently during 
conflicting trials. A score equal to or close to zero would suggest that children did not 
discriminate between reward rules conditions. A benefit of using differential scores was 
the option to model the data via a regression model that did not require a repeated-
measures component. Please see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of each variable. 
3.3.1.2. Children’s age 
Participants’ age was treated as a continuous variable and measured in months. 
3.3.1.3. Rules recall and Working memory 
Every time participants repeated back correctly the rules to the experimenter 
(before and/or after each round, including practice rounds) they received 1 point and 0 
otherwise (maximum score = 8). Also, after the hiding game was over, every time that 
participants repeated back a sequence of numbers from the digit span correctly, their 
response was coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise; maximum score possible = 14 for each 
forward/backward section, total combined = 28). A higher score in the digit span task 
 40 
indicated higher overall working memory. Finally, to control for age effects children’s 
raw scores were normalized via the WISC’s scaled scores tables (maximum scaled score 
possible = 19). In order to use the latest available scaled scores provided by the WISC-
IV, four additional points were added to children’s WISC-R overall scores. 
Table 1. Average scores for each measure, along with standard deviations, minimum and 
maximum scores 
Measure N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Differential Scores 40 .85 7.76 -16 20 
Age in Months 40 104.10 11.69 86 129 
Working Memory 40 10.15 2.70 5 17 
Recursive Awareness 40 8.05 1.11 4 9 
Interpretive ToM 40 4.88 1.29 2 6 
General Trust 40 31.63 5.25 21 44 
3.3.1.4. Recursive awareness 
Every time that participants correctly matched the description they heard with the 
corresponding picture, their response was coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise; maximum score = 
9). A higher score in the picture matching task indicated higher overall recursive 
reasoning. 
3.3.1.5. Interpretive ToM  
Every time participants predicted that any individual who looked at the occluded 
but informative picture (i.e., due to a window) would know what was being depicted, 
their response was coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise; maximum score = 6). Higher scores were 
indicative of an “adequately” developed interpretive ToM, whereas lower scores 
suggested an over-interpretive ToM. 
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3.3.1.6. Generalized (mis)trust 
For each story, participants’ opinions of the likelihood that the character would 
keep his or her word were coded in the following way: very unlikely = 1, a little unlikely 
= 2, a little likely = 3, very likely = 4 (maximum score = 48). The higher the score the 
more generally trusting of others the participant was considered. Conversely, lower 
scores indicated higher generalized mistrust. 
3.3.2. Children’s selective learning  
To determine what factors may have been associated with children’s performance 
in the finding game, and between each other, all the measures detailed above were first 
evaluated via a correlation matrix. Then, to test for predictive power, participants’ 
differential scores were entered in a linear regression model as the dependent measure, 
evaluated as a function of their age, interpretive ToM, recursive awareness, working 
memory, and generalized trust scores, as well as all the possible two-way interaction 
terms. In addition, children’s differential scores were compared to zero (0) so as to 
determine whether, like in Experiment 1, children discriminated between reward 
conditions. Finally, participants’ raw scores were compared to chance (i.e., 50% = 10) to 
test if children systematically (mis)trusted their partners during each reward condition. 
Note that there was a ceiling effect on children’s recall of the reward rules (35 out of 40 
children had perfect recall, and no child failed less than 6 out of 8 recall prompts). 
Therefore this variable was excluded from subsequent analyses. 
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3.3.2.1. Correlates of participants’ performance 
As seen in Table 2, the better working memory the children had, the more adult-
like performance they exhibited (i.e., by trusting more often their partner during common 
than conflicting trials). There also was a non-significant tendency for children who 
showed more generalized trust to endorse partners’ messages more often during common 
trials. Recursive awareness was another factor related to multiple variables. Specifically, 
as children’s age and generalized trust increased, so did their ability to identify pictures 
illustrating recursive loops (e.g., dad is thinking that mom is thinking of him thinking of 
her). 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 1 
Measures Statistics 
Differential 
Scores 
Age in 
Months 
Working 
Memory 
Recursive 
Awareness 
Interpretive 
ToM 
General 
Trust 
Differential 
Scores 
Spearman 1 -.05 .34 .06 -.02 .25 
p-value   .75 .03 .72 .89 .12 
Age in 
Months 
Spearman -.05 1 -.06 .40 .04 .21 
p-value .75   .69 .01 .79 .19 
Working 
Memory 
Spearman  .34 -.06 1  .26 -.11 .22 
p-value .03 .69   .11 .51 .18 
Recursive 
Awareness 
Spearman .06  .40  .26 1 -.09  .37 
p-value .72 .01 .11   .60 .02 
Interpret 
ToM 
Spearman -.02 .04 -.11 -.09 1 .05 
p-value .89 .79 .51 .60   .74 
General 
Trust 
Spearman .25 .21 .22 .37 .05 1 
p-value .12 .19 .18 .02 .74   
3.3.2.2. Predictors of participants’ performance  
Participants’ differential scores were entered in a linear regression model as the 
dependent measure, evaluated as a function of their age, interpretive ToM, recursive 
awareness, working memory, and generalized trust scores. The interaction terms of the 
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linear regression were not significant (p > .25 for all comparisons), and thus were 
removed from the initial model. The new model indicated that only children’s working 
memory significantly predicted children’s trust decisions (see Table 3) in the finding 
game. There also was a nonsignificant tendency for children’s generalized trust to be 
predictive of their differential scores in the finding game. Figure 3 illustrates the relation 
between these variables. 
Table 3. Regression model coefficients, t-test, and confidence intervals 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-test 
p-
value 
  
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error 
  Beta   
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) -12.42 13.83 
  
-0.90 .38 
 
-40.52 15.68 
Interpretive ToM -0.02 0.95 
 
0.00 -0.02 .98 
 
-1.95 1.91 
Recursive 
Awareness 
-0.51 1.28 
 
-0.07 -0.40 .69 
 
-3.12 2.10 
General Trust 0.35 0.25 
 
0.24 1.41 .17 
 
-0.16 0.86 
Working Memory 0.97 0.46 
 
0.34 2.11 .04 
 
0.03 1.91 
Age in Months -0.03 0.11   -0.05 -0.29 .77   -0.27 0.20 
3.3.2.3. Effects of reward conditions  
Children’s average differentials scores were compared to zero (0) via t-tests to 
determine whether, like in Experiment 1, children discriminated between reward rules 
when earning tokens instead of candy. As a group, children did not trust the partners 
more in one condition versus the other, M = 0.85, SD = 7.76, t(39) = 0.69, p = .49.  
 Figure 3. Unstandardized predicted values of children’s performance, divided by their 
working memory (top panel) and generalized trust (bottom panel) scores
Additional analyses were conducted with children divided into two groups by 
performing a median split for the variables that affected 
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(working memory) 
 
or potentially 
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tended to affect (generalized trust) their differential scores. Children with greater working 
memory appeared to have endorsed their partner’s messages more often in the common 
than conflicting trials, as suggested by their positive average score (M = 2.55, SD = 
9.87). The reverse seemed true for children with lower working memory (i.e., endorsing 
more messages during conflicting than common trials; M = -0.85, SD = 4.48). However, 
neither of these patterns were statistically different from zero (t(19) = 1.16, p = .26 and 
t(19) = -0.85, p = .41, respectively). The difference between the averages of the two 
groups was not significant (t(26.50) = -1.40, p = .17). A complementary result was found 
with children who demonstrated lower or higher generalized trust: Children with higher 
generalized trust endorsed messages significantly more frequently during common trials, 
M = 4.30, SD = 8.34, t(19) = 2.31, p = .032. Conversely, children with lower trust 
endorsed the partner’s messages significantly less often in the common than conflicting 
trials, M = -2.60, SD = 5.38, t(19) = -2.16, p = .044. These two groups’ scores differed 
significantly from each other, t(38) = -3.11, p = .004.  
3.3.2.4. Behavioral patterns in children’s raw scores  
A limitation of the differential scores is that it “occludes” additional patterns in 
the data. For example, differential scores do not reveal whether children did not 
discriminate between conditions because they trusted partners at/above/below chance 
levels during both common and conflicting trials. To further explore the participants’ 
decision-making, children’s raw scores during both common and conflicting trials first 
were compared to a chance distribution (50% = 10) via t-tests.  
 Figure 4. Percentage of children endorsing their partner’s message per trial and reward 
condition 
46 
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When interests were common, children endorsed their partner’s messages more 
frequently than what would be predicted by chance, M = 14.48, SD = 5.48, t(39) = 5.17, 
p < .001. Children exhibited a similar behavior when interest conflicted, M = 13.63, SD = 
6.32, t(39) = 3.63, p = .001. Figure 4 shows children’s overall trial-by-trial responses, as 
well as their performance when split by the median memory and generalized trust scores.  
3.3.2.5. Children’s expectations of partners  
When explicitly asked: “Did you think the other player was trying to trick you or 
not really? Why is that?” in reference to the common trials, 36 out of 40 children offered 
a response. As would be expected from identifying common interests, the majority of 
participants (27 out of 36) did not express any suspicions that the other player intended to 
trick them. This proportion of participants was above what would be predicted by chance 
(i.e., 50%; Binomial test, p = .004). When asked why they thought that about the 
partner’s intentions, 19 out of 34 participants who offered an explanation cited the 
consequences of the game (e.g., "If they trick me, then they will have a good chance of 
not getting a coin”; “They also want coins”; "Judging by how many coins I got in the 
end, we can say he didn't trick me"). The remaining participants offered explanations not 
related to the game (e.g., "Some people try to trick you"; “They might be younger than 
me”; "Just didn't think so"; "The other player tricked me sometimes, but it's hard to 
explain"). The proportion of children offering these two types of explanations was 
statistically comparable (Binomial test, p = .61). Children’s perceptions of whether or not 
the partner tried to trick them was not related to the explanation they provided (Fisher’s 
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exact test, p = 1). The full list of children’s explanations can be found in the Appendix 
section. 
3.3.2.6. Complementary Analyses  
As described in the Method section, some measures had subcomponents, such as 
items in the recursive awareness task that measured either general theory of mind or 
recursive awareness skills. To the extent that children are engaging in recursive thinking 
during conflicting trials, it is reasonable to expect that recursive awareness-relevant items 
may be associated with adult-like performance (whereas it may or may not be the case for 
general ToM items).  
Table 4. Correlation matrix 2 
 
Measures Statistics 
Differential 
Scores 
Common 
trials 
Conflicting 
trials 
Differential 
Scores 
Spearman 1.000 .575 -.521 
p-value . .000 .001 
Common 
trials 
Spearman 
 
1.000 .270 
p-value .000 . .092 
Conflicting 
trials 
Spearman 
 
.270 1.000 
p-value .001 .092 . 
Recursive-
relevant 
Spearman .083 .218 .098 
p-value .610 .177 .548 
Non-
recursive 
Spearman .215 .081 -.212 
p-value .182 .618 .189 
Negative 
outcome 
Spearman .150 .120 -.123 
p-value .356 .459 .448 
Neutral/No 
outcome 
Spearman .254 .088 -.218 
p-value .113 .591 .178 
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Moreover, the generalized trust scale tested children’s trustworthiness 
expectations for scenarios in which no immediate consequence was made available in the 
story, as well as in scenarios where the outcome was often negative for the story 
character. Arguably, children who may express skepticism in a trust scale for items with 
negative outcomes as much as for items with no outcomes may be more mistrusting than 
children who primarily showed skepticism during negative-outcome scenarios. If so, 
these two trust subscales might be associated differently with children’s behaviors during 
common trials or overall selectivity. However, as Table 4 shows, none of these subscales 
were significantly associated with children’s differential or raw scores. 
Finally, in light of the failure to replicate an overall effect of reward rules on 
children’s guessing behavior, their responses during the witness practice trials also were 
analyzed. These were coded following a similar methodology as described above to 
obtain differential scores (range: -5 to 5). Unlike when playing as guessers, witness 
participants systematically shared more truthful messages during common versus 
conflicting trials—as indicated by a positive mean that was significantly different from 
zero (0): M = 0.93, SD = 1.90, t(39) = 3.08, p = .004. In addition, comparing their raw 
scores (see Figure 5) to a chance distribution (50% = 2.5) indicated that children sent 
truthful messages to their partners more frequently than expected by chance. This was 
true both during common interests trials, M = 4.28, SD = 1.04, t(39) = 10.82, p < .001, 
and when interests conflicted, M = 3.35, SD = 1.78, t(39) = 3.03, p = .004. 
  Figure 5. Percentage of children sending the correct location of the reward
per trial and reward condition
When children’s differential scores were entered in a regression model 
measured psychological factors
significantly associated with
comparisons). Children’s differential scores as witnesses were not significantly related to 
their scores as guessers, rs(40) = .16
3.4. DISCUSSION 
 The main goal of this study was to evaluate potential socio
associated with children’s motive
differential scores (i.e., trusting more during common reward trails) was considered an 
indicator of children’s understanding that people with conflicting motivations are more 
likely to deceive. Results showed that, as children’s ability to remember and manipulate 
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 to partners
 
 as predictors, none of the individual measures was 
 children’s behavior as witnesses (p > 
, p = .34. 
-cognitive factors 
-based selective learning from others. Positive 
, 
with the 
.40, for all 
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information develops, there is an increase in the likelihood that they will take advantage 
of common (over conflicting) ground between them and an information source. 
Additionally, children’s general intuitions about whether or not other individuals are 
likely to keep their word tended to predict the participants’ adult-like discrimination 
between reward conditions when receiving information from others. 
 In this study there was evidence for the role that memory plays on children’s 
motive-based learning. It is important to note that it was not just a matter of recalling, but 
also actively manipulating and/or integrating the rules (i.e., working memory) into their 
decisions, that was predictive of children’s adult-like performance. Specifically, all 
children were typically able to recall, before and after each round, what the consequences 
of the game were per the reward rules. Nonetheless, only children with higher working 
memory succeeded at correctly trusting their partner more often during common versus 
conflicting trials. To my knowledge this is the first study that directly associates 
children’s discerning trust to their working memory abilities. 
 In addition, a nonsignificant trend indicated that the more children believed that 
people would not actually keep their word the less they tended to trust partners during 
common over conflicting trials. Thus, in order for children to fully take advantage of 
common ground between themselves and a partner, it seems that children could benefit 
from having had positive experiences that lead them to perceive others as generally 
trustworthy. There is evidence that other types of generalized mistrust, especially those 
founded in racial differences, can affect older children’s performance in learning 
environments. For instance, Yeager and colleagues (2014) initially assessed children’s 
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perceptions of whether their school was fair to them and their racial group while 
assigning various groups to feedback interventions. The assumption was that children’s 
mistrust in the educational system emerges, in part, due to children’s uncertainty about 
teachers’ intentions: when receiving critical feedback, racial minority children may 
interpret the criticism as driven by stereotypes, as opposed to high institutional standards. 
This mistrust in turn demotivates children from engaging with the feedback that teachers 
provide for their academic assignments. The authors found that an intervention that 
clearly emphasized the feedback as a product of the teacher’s high standards had multiple 
positive effects, including raising African Americans’ grades. These effects were 
particularly strong for participants who expressed great mistrust of the school system. 
 An unexpected result was that, unlike in Experiment 1, children as a group (i.e., 
without taking into account individual differences from other measures) did not 
discriminate between reward conditions when guessing, but effectively did so when 
instructing partners. Further, whereas in Experiment 1 there was an association between 
children’s performances as guessers and witnesses, this was not the case in Experiment 2. 
Still, the fact that children in the witness role did distinguish between conditions indicates 
that they understood the task and its rules.  
One of the main differences between the two experiments was the incentives used 
as reward: candy versus golden coins serving as tokens for prizes. It is important to 
acknowledge that the trust task in the present study was presented as a game, which could 
have triggered expectations in children that may have not been present otherwise. For 
example, even young children respond to questions differently based on whether they are 
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asked in a serious versus playful context (e.g., Grosse & Tomasello, 2012). It is possible 
that children in the present study were primed to adopt a generally competitive gaming 
mindset due to the framing that was used. This was particularly likely in Experiment 2, 
where the use of cumulative coins as rewards and the game being presented in a 
computer may have reminded children of comparable video game experiences (e.g., the 
Mario Bros franchise, a popular video game that includes collecting coins) and for the 
guessing role: Games typically include preprogrammed challenges and locations of 
collectables that dictate the overall pace (a role more similar to witnessing than guessing 
in the task). Conversely, players of the games are tasked with the decisions of how to 
approach these challenges and discover the rewards (a role more similar to guessing than 
witnessing in the task).  
Arguably, children in the current study may have been better aware of their own 
goals and felt more in control as witnesses. Conversely, they might have been less certain 
about what the partner intended to do once he or she was the one sending the messages 
(e.g., help each other vs. challenge them in the game). In that regard, a future direction 
could be to label the partner as a “teammate” or even frame the task as an activity or test, 
rather than a game. These adjustments can help further verify whether the trust task used 
was sensitive only to children’s selective learning or also to general problem-solving and 
“game-savvy” attributes.   
 54 
4. General Discussion 
 The main goals of the dissertation were to examine whether: (a) children’s 
selective learning from other individuals is influenced by self-interest-related incentives 
alone, and (b) there are potential socio-cognitive factors that predict children’s inference-
based trust decisions. Regarding the first goal, there was initial evidence in Experiment 1 
that in the absence of prior cooperativeness information, both children and adults aligned 
their behavior to match self-interests. Specifically, in that experiment participants 
endorsed messages as guessers more frequently if having common rather than conflicting 
interests. However, this discerning trust exhibited in Experiment 1 was not replicated in 
Experiment 2, when children guessed the location of exchangeable tokens. Recently, we 
were able to document that when candy is used as a reward, even 4-year-olds can trust 
partners more often during common interests trials in a finding game. Thus, differences 
in performance between experiments could have been driven partly by the stimulus that 
was used, but also by broader contextual cues, such as the framing of the study as a game 
(see section 3.4). 
Notably, even in Experiment 1 (where children discriminated between reward 
conditions as guessers) there were important developmental differences: comparing 
children and adults’ behaviors showed that children were less trusting than adults with 
partners who had common interests. These differences in performance motivated the 
study’s second goal: exploring potential socio-cognitive factors affecting children’s 
inference-based trust decisions. Out of all the candidate variables—working memory, 
generalized trust, interpretive ToM, recursive awareness, and age—only the first variable 
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systematically exerted an effect on children’s ability to learn selectively from their 
partners. Specifically, children with higher memory skills were more likely to 
demonstrate an understanding that motives can affect other individuals’ reliability. This 
understanding was reflected in children’s decisions to trust partners more frequently 
during common versus conflicting trials. Additionally, a nonsignificant trend suggested 
that children who were generally trusting of others tended to endorse their partner’s 
messages more often when both benefitted from a successful guess. 
The finding that working memory predicted adult-like performance in the task 
raises the question of whether this association is limited to experimental settings or is also 
representative of real-life decision making. On the one hand, when a child is presented 
with novel individuals and/or contexts it is central for the child to keep track of those 
individuals’ reputations and/or cues associated with their reliability. Arguably, the greater 
the child’s capacity to maintain and manipulate information (i.e., working memory), the 
more effectively can he or she navigate an unfamiliar scenario—allying with reliable 
partners and avoiding potential exploiters. On the other hand, if the reliability of a group 
of individuals already is well documented (e.g., individuals are part of safe and proven 
environments, such as parents at home or friends at school), it would be reasonable to 
expect that greater memory capacity may not exert much influence in whether or not 
children trust selectively.  
It was rather surprising that children’s ability to reason recursively (e.g., thinking 
about what the partner is thinking they are thinking) was not associated with performance 
in the game. One possibility is that, instead of thinking about the partner’s own behavior 
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and thoughts, children might have focused only on their own experience in the game and 
deducted behavioral rules of what to do for each reward rule. However, children’s 
explanations about why (or why not) partners may have tricked them during conflicting 
(Experiment 1) and common trials (Experiment 2) suggest that at least some of them 
reasoned about their partners, even if a posteriori. A potential complementary explanation 
is that the measure that was used may have not fully captured individual differences 
related to the trust task, as it was focused on what others thought of. In contrast, the trust 
task was about others’ motivations. Thus, it is still possible that a measure that directly 
tests children’s reasoning about what other individuals intend to do might be a better 
predictor of children’s trust behavior.  
Another unexpected outcome was the lack of association between children’s over-
interpretive ToM and their discerning trust. The premise was that children who showed 
an over-interpretive ToM could also be wrongly assuming that partners were interpreting 
the rules differently—and thus would exhibit lower trust during common trials than 
children with a “proper” ToM. When looking at the actual scores, it is possible that a 
ceiling effect masked any potential association between these two variables; overall, there 
were relatively few “over-interpreters” as only 5 out of 40 children scored 3 or less (out 
of 6 maximum points) on the task. Perhaps larger participant samples or a more difficult 
task could increase the possibility of capturing individual differences in these measures, 
as well as the detection of additional statistical associations.  
It was expected that working memory would not be affected by age, as children’s 
raw scores were normalized via the WISC-IV’s scaled scores. Experiment 2 did 
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successfully replicate prior findings associating children’s recursive reasoning with their 
age. However, there were no age differences in children’s over-interpretive ToM. As 
described above, this failure to replicate any findings related to this ToM task (i.e., trust 
or age related) may have been a product of the lack of power and/or task difficulty. In 
addition, age not having an effect on children’s performance in the trust game was a 
consistent outcome in both experiments—and accords with prior findings on the 
developmental trajectory of self-interest-based credibility judgments (i.e., in hypothetical 
scenarios, see Mills & Keil, 2005). This result opens the possibility that any additional 
cognitive maturation taking place between ages 7 and 10 may not be a significant factor 
in children’s ability to succeed in the trust task.     
Overall, the findings reported in the two experiments suggest that by the 
elementary school years children have some intuitions about the role that underlying 
motives can have on people’s credibility. However, the facts that (a) children’s 
performance was not consistent across experiments and (b) their performance was not on 
par with that of adults indicate that even at 10 years of age children’s integration of self-
interest information is still not fully matured. Much debate exists regarding the 
developmental trajectory that characterizes children’s balancing of skepticism and 
credulity. On the one hand, a popular view portrays children as being: “…especially 
credulous, especially gullible…yet to master the intricacies of doubt” (Gilbert, 1991, 
p.111), and having “a specific, highly robust bias to trust [other individuals’] testimony” 
(Jaswal et al., 2010, p.1546). This view has been supported by young children’s failure to 
trust selectively when person-specific information such as a partner’s history of accuracy 
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is available (e.g., Jaswal et al., 2010; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). On the other hand, past 
research has also shown that children can appear to be overly skeptical in other domains: 
when evaluating the possibility of improbable events like getting struck by lightning 
(Shtulman & Carey, 2007) or the reality status of novel entities such as a machine that 
tells you if there is metal nearby (Cook & Sobel, 2011).  
A compelling thesis founded on recent empirical and theoretical contributions, 
along with the present findings, is that the developmental issue is not whether young 
children are inherently credulous or skeptical. Instead, the challenge that children face is 
to overcome generalized difficulties when reasoning about other people’s knowledge, 
motives, and/or behavior. Two factors that appear to increase young children’s selective 
learning from others are: (a) the opportunity to gain confidence in their predictions and 
(b) the presence of multiple cues associated with reliability. Contrasting findings on 
preschoolers’ trust decisions best illustrate these claims: When evaluating statements 
from a lone unfamiliar individual, 3-year-olds fail to trust selectively; that is, they trust 
trickers (Vanderbilt et al., 2009), false labelers (Vanderbilt, Heyman, & Liu, 2014), and 
big liars (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009, Experiment 2b).  
Notably, 3-year-olds’ selectivity improves when provided with relevant 
experience; that is, having opportunities that increase their confidence when predicting 
reliability. For example, Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009) gave children an opportunity to 
provide information and experience first-hand situation-specific constraints (lack of 
visual access) of an informant before hearing his testimony. The participants then showed 
discriminating trust when playing a labeling game. Moreover, there is evidence that even 
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2- to 3-year-olds are more likely to mistrust a single unreliable individual when confident 
in their own judgments (Jaswal, 2010; Experiment 4; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012, 
familiar labels; Ma & Ganea, 2010; Experiment 2-3). In the present study, an additional 
difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was that children from Experiment 1 played as 
witnesses for half of the game. It is possible that, in addition to the simplicity of the 
rewards, having had that extensive experience as informants increased children’s 
confidence in their predictions and facilitated selectivity about their partners’ testimony. 
However, future research is needed to directly evaluate this argument. 
A second factor that seems to influence children’s selectivity is being presented 
with a combination of cues associated with reliability. For example, 3-year-olds mistrust 
a sole inaccurate individual if provided with behavioral (object mislabeling) plus 
situational (individuals’ visual access) indicators of reliability (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 
2009). Similarly, 3-year-olds trust selectively when an individual is associated with 
multiple reliability-related attributes (e.g., a familiar source portrayed as scary, mean, and 
tricky; Heyman et al., 2013, baseline vs. deception condition) or when being explicitly 
presented with multiple statements (e.g., two sources simultaneously provide contrasting 
novel names; Koenig et al., 2004). It would be interesting to determine whether, for 
example, manipulating the identity of the partner in the candy game would also aid 
children’s performance (see Future Directions). 
4.1. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 As mentioned in the introduction, a limitation that pertains to previous studies is 
that there has been little exploration of mechanisms behind children’s motive-based 
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selectivity. This shortage represents a valuable opportunity for future research. In the 
present study the role of working memory was documented. However, it remains 
unknown whether other executive function components such as inhibition and switching 
skills also play a role in children’s inferences from motives exclusively. For example, 
inhibition may have been critical for adults to restrain any preconceptions produced by 
playing with a stranger, and to favor the rational argument that partners who benefit from 
one’s success are likely to be helpful. Similarly, shifting skills may have been useful for 
flexibly assigning the same individual to opposing categories such as partner-reliable or 
partner-unreliable, depending on the game rules. 
 This study also raised the possibility that social and experiential factors like 
children’s generalized trust might play a role on their learning decisions. It would be 
interesting to investigate what early experiences could affect children’s general intuitions 
about others’ likelihood of keeping their word. For example, to my knowledge it is not 
clear if children’s birth order, or even whether or not they have an older sibling, leads 
them to be overly mistrusting in limited-resources scenarios. It is also possible that 
children (and perhaps adults) with various attachment styles will approach tasks like the 
one presented in this study differently, with insecurely attached individuals being most 
mistrusting of their partners. More broadly, it would be useful to integrate feedback into 
the trust task so as to verify whether, even if children may not infer trustworthiness from 
rules alone, they can nonetheless become selective with feedback. An ongoing study with 
preschoolers using a modified version of this trust paradigm suggests that, with feedback, 
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even 4-year-olds can learn to trust partners more often during common than conflicting 
trials. 
 Finally, it would be interesting to determine the effect, if any, that affiliation cues 
have on children’s trust in partners during common interest trials. When having an 
opportunity to assist other individuals with whom they are affiliated, children often 
behave helpfully: Children share more material resources with friends and (unfamiliar) 
in-group members than with non-friends and out-group members (e.g., Engelmann, Over, 
Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013; Moore, 2009; Olson & Spelke, 2008). Further, children 
predict that people feel greater obligation to help (and are happier when successfully 
helping) members of the in-group versus out-group (e.g., Weller & Lagattuta, 2013). In 
the present study children played the game with unfamiliar partners. It is possible that 
when paired with in-group partners children will be more likely to take full advantage of 
common ground. 
4.2. CONCLUSIONS 
For societies to function properly, its members need to identify dependable 
partners with whom to exchange goods, services, and favors (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). 
If a potential collaborator is completely unfamiliar, trustworthiness often must be 
deduced. The ability to predict reliability from situation-specific cues to motives is 
invaluable in such circumstances. This study shows that elementary school children 
sometimes are proficient at predicting the motive-based behaviors of others. These 
predictions improve with development, aided by enhanced working memory skills and a 
greater ability to integrate multiple cues during complex experimental tasks (as well as, 
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potentially, positive experiences that increase children’s generalized trust in others). 
Thus, as their social cognition develops, children may not simply transition from 
credulity to skepticism. Instead, children may become increasingly competent at 
deducing credibility from the underlying motivations of other individuals. 
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Appendix A: Working memory task 
 Children were read a sequence of numbers and then asked to repeat them. In the 
first phase children had to repeat the sequence in the same order in which they heard it. 
During a second phase the sequences had to be repeated backward. 
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Appendix B: Interpretive theory of mind 
 
Procedure (extracted from Lagattuta et al, 2010): 
Participants watched one character (Sam or Alex, counterbalanced) come out of 
his or her house and view a black-and-white drawing. The character labeled the picture 
(e.g., “Ooh, a giraffe”) and went back inside the house. Then, the experimenter covered 
up the picture with a laminated opaque card that had a clear window revealing a small 
part of the picture. The experimenter then took both characters out of their houses to view 
the obstructed picture. 
Participants were asked three test questions about the thoughts of Sam and Alex: 
(a) “Sam [has/has never] seen this picture before, what will Sam think this is?” (b) “Alex 
[has/has never] seen this picture before, what will Alex think this is?” (c) “Why 
[did/didn’t] they think the same thing?” (whatever the participant predicts). After children 
answered the questions about Sam and Alex, a third character, Joe, drove up in his/her 
car. The experimenter said, “Look, here comes Joe. He/she (gender matched to Sam and 
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Alex) did not see or hear what we were doing.” Then, the last test question was: (d) “Joe 
has never seen this picture before; what will Joe think this is?” For each correct answer of 
questions a, b, and d, children got 1 point, for a total of 3 points per trial (two trials in 
total). 
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Appendix C: Generalized mistrust 
A trust index was formed by averaging children’s responses to a subset of 
questions (listed below) extracted from Rotenberg’s trust questionnaire (Rotenberg et al, 
2005). The items were rated by participants on a scale from 1 – 4 (1 = Very unlikely, 2 = 
A little unlikely, 3 = A little likely, 4 = Very likely). 
Neutral/No outcome: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative/Additional outcome info: 
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Appendix D: Recursive awareness 
 Children saw pictures depicting a subset of scenarios (listed below) from Miller et 
al. (1970): 
      
Item type   Scenario 
General 
ToM 
  The boy is thinking of the girl and father 
  The boy is thinking of the girl 
  The boy is thinking of the girl, father, and mother 
  The boy is thinking that the girl is talking to father 
  The boy is thinking that he is talking to the girl 
Recursive 
loops 
  The boy is thinking that he is thinking of the girl 
  The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of father 
  
The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of the father thinking of 
mother 
  The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of him thinking of her 
Then they were read each scenario (one at a time) and asked to point to the picture 
that depicted it. Some sample pictures have been include ed in the next page. 
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Appendix E: Children’s Explanations, Experiment 2 
Trick? Why/Why not? 
No So we both could get a coin. 
No If they trick me, then they will have a good chance of not getting a coin. 
No Knew the answer. 
No Because he would say it might all the true, because he knows that if prove right he 
also gets a coin. 
No Because, of course, they want to get coins too, so they won't trick me. 
No Well the other player may not have tricked me, but you can never be sure, still, I 
don't know. 
No They probably sent me the correct message. 
No Looked what it says and got it right. 
No Because I didn't trick him, and I got some wrong. 
No I make quick friends. 
No Not really but sometimes; some people is not their thing to do like this. So, I 
personally don't follow them. 
No Judging by how many coins I got in the end, we can say he didn't trick me. 
No The other player sent the right messages so that we both could get coins. 
No He wouldn't get a coin and neither would I. So, he wouldn't trick me. 
No They might be younger than me. 
No Just didn't think so. 
No It would be rude if the other player tricked me. 
No Too many blue not many red. 
No So, he can also get coins. 
No If they did, I would get mad, but, I don't think they will try to trick me. 
No They also want coins. 
No Because we would have both lost. 
No I'm sure the other kid wouldn't be mean or try to trick me. 
No He wanted coins and he wanted us to get coins. 
No Both get coins. 
No Easy game? 
No Never played before. 
Yes Because maybe they might not want to get that many coins. 
Yes Maybe he was tricking me so he can get more coins than me. 
Yes Some people try to trick you. 
Yes Maybe once. 
Yes The other player told the truth because we both could get coins. 
Yes The other player tricked me sometimes, but it's hard to explain. 
Yes The other player tried to trick me. 
Yes Sometimes the other player tried to trick me. 
Yes The other player might have pressed the wrong button to get more coins than me. 
Yes I also tried to trick the other player, so, I thought he would do that, too. 
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Yes They might have not wanted me to have lots of coins. 
Yes I had to depend on him because he can have lots of coins. 
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